Beyond reward expectancy: How do periodic incentive payments influence the temporal dynamics of performance? by Frankort, H. T. W. & Avgoustaki, A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Frankort, H. T. W. ORCID: 0000-0002-0022-1570 and Avgoustaki, A. (2021). 
Beyond reward expectancy: How do periodic incentive payments influence the temporal 
dynamics of performance?. Journal of Management, 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/25926/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online





BEYOND REWARD EXPECTANCY: HOW DO PERIODIC INCENTIVE PAYMENTS 




Hans T.W. Frankort 

















Acknowledgements: We are indebted to the management and employees at the case firm for 
granting access to proprietary data and for generously facilitating this research project. Associate 
Editor Aaron Hill and the anonymous reviewers provided excellent guidance. We also wish to 
acknowledge Lamar Pierce for encouragement, and Nick Bacon, Santi Furnari, Olenka 
Kacperczyk, JR Keller, Jaime Ortega, Paolo Volpin, Gokhan Yildirim, and participants in the 2017 
Madrid Work and Organizations Workshop at IE Business School, the 2018 Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting in Chicago, and SMS Virtual 2020 for helpful comments and 
suggestions. During part of the research for this article, Argyro Avgoustaki was a Visiting Scholar 
at the Department of Management Science at Lancaster University Management School, and both 
authors were Visiting Scholars at the Departamento de Economía de la Empresa at Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid. We thank Eduardo Melero, Jaime Ortega, Neus Palomeras, and Gokhan 
Yildirim for their hospitality. Research grants from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and 
Competitiveness (ECO2015-69615-R) and ESCP Business School are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Corresponding author: Argyro Avgoustaki, ESCP Business School, 527 Finchley Road, London 
NW3 7BG, UK 
 
Email: aavgoustaki@escp.eu  




Prior theory suggests that incentive plans, such as piece-rate or commission plans, motivate good 
performance because employees anticipate that current performance will generate matching future 
incentive payments. In this article, we move beyond reward expectancy to argue that performance 
can also derive from employees’ reactive responses to received incentive payments. We propose a 
salience-based theory casting incentive payments as recurring temporal markers that periodically 
increase the salience of the incentive plan, to which employees respond by temporarily increasing 
incentivized and unincentivized performance. We introduce multivariate time-series methods to 
test our hypotheses in longitudinal data spanning 169 weeks (1183 days), drawn from an online 
firm using an incentive plan for its customer-support employees. While we find no evidence that 
incentive payments affect the dynamics of incentivized performance, they do temporarily boost 
several unincentivized behaviors and outcomes. Combined with fieldwork, these findings support 
our proposed mechanism of ‘salience-induced reciprocity’ – i.e., the temporary reciprocity in 
response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. This article contributes to a 
more complete understanding of performance and effort dynamics in incentive plans, offers new 
inroads into studying temporality in the functioning of HR practices, and provides other future 
research avenues. 
 
Keywords: pay-for-performance; incentive plan; incentive payment; performance dynamics; 
salience; reciprocity; multivariate time-series analysis 
  
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS AND PERFORMANCE DYNAMICS 
3 
 
BEYOND REWARD EXPECTANCY: HOW DO PERIODIC INCENTIVE PAYMENTS 
INFLUENCE THE TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF PERFORMANCE? 
Nonexecutive employees often work under some form of incentive plan (e.g., WorldatWork 
2016), which is one type of pay-for-performance system in which, apart from a base salary, 
employees periodically receive incentive payments for their performance on specified tasks, 
according to a transparent, pre-agreed formula. For example, sales representatives may earn a 
commission tied to their sales performance and call-center employees may be rewarded by the 
number of calls taken. There is continuing interest in understanding the performance effects of such 
incentive plans (Bloom & Van Reenen 2011). Empirical studies have compared performance under 
incentive plans to that under flat or hourly wages, and the evidence seems to imply that, on average, 
performance tends to be higher under incentive plans (e.g., Banker, Lee, & Potter 1996; Lazear 
2000; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny 1980; Shearer 2004). The foremost explanation for 
such evidence has been that incentive plans, as soon as they are in place, permit the credible 
anticipation that current performance generates matching future rewards, and such reward 
expectancy can motivate employees to perform well (Lawler 1973; Prendergast 1999).1 
However, in its tendency to attribute the effectiveness of incentive plans to reward expectancy, 
prior work has directed less attention to the idea that performance may also derive from reactive 
responses to received rewards – i.e., the actual incentive payments employees periodically take. 
Yet understanding how the receipt of incentive payments – a periodic event native to any incentive 
plan – influences performance is important on both theoretical and practical grounds. First, by 
moving beyond reward expectancy stemming from the mere existence of an incentive plan, a study 
of whether, why, and how received incentive payments influence subsequent performance 
contributes to a more complete theory of the performance effects of incentive plans. Second, and 
related, the intermittency with which employees receive incentive payments naturally raises 
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS AND PERFORMANCE DYNAMICS 
4 
 
questions about the temporal dynamics that characterize potential performance responses. Research 
theorizing and examining such temporality is needed because it can be highly actionable, for 
example, by offering implications to employers for when to expose employees to HR interventions 
other than incentive payment, such as informal feedback or commitment-building activities. 
Of course, a wider literature exists on the performance responses to received pay. For example, 
some work has focused on types of pay-for-performance systems other than incentive plans, such 
as discretionary bonus or stock-option plans (e.g., Cappelli, Conyon, & Almeda 2020; Kahn & 
Sherer 1990; Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor 2016). In this work, explanations for why performance may 
respond to received rewards – e.g., discretionary bonuses or profits from the sale of stock options 
– are typically traceable to ex-ante uncertainty regarding how much a unit of individual 
performance will be (deemed) worth. Yet incentive plans do not yield such uncertainty because, 
from the moment of implementation, performance has a transparent, deterministic, and predictable 
link to incentive payments. A different strand of work has studied outcomes following the day on 
which salaries are paid, revealing few implications of payday for factors such as cognitive 
performance, decision-making quality, or organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g., Carvalho, 
Meier, & Wang 2016; Steed 2018). Yet incentive payments are distinct in deriving from a 
discretionary HR practice and so they could elicit responses where ordinary salary payments might 
not. Overall, what seems missing is a theory of the dynamic performance consequences of received 
incentive payments that does not require ex-ante uncertainty regarding the performance-reward 
relationship, while at the same time accounting for the discretionary nature of an incentive plan. 
Thus, the purpose of this article is to theorize and examine how periodic incentive payments 
influence the temporal dynamics of performance in an ongoing incentive plan. Drawing from prior 
research on salience and attention in management (Garg, Jiang, & Lepak 2021; Ocasio 2011), 
economics (DellaVigna 2009; Englmaier, Roider, & Sunde 2017), and psychology (Fiske & Taylor 
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2013; Schacter 1999; Tversky & Kahneman 1974), we propose a salience-based theory that 
generates two hypotheses regarding the temporary effects of periodic incentive payments on 
incentivized and unincentivized performance. We test these hypotheses using multivariate time-
series methods (Lütkepohl 2005), applied to unique longitudinal data spanning 169 weeks (1183 
days), drawn from an online firm using an incentive plan for its customer-support employees. 
Across econometric analyses and fieldwork, our findings suggest that periodic incentive payments 
temporarily boost various kinds of unincentivized behaviors and outcomes, while we find no 
evidence that they affect the dynamics of incentivized performance. These patterns are broadly 
consistent with our proposed mechanism of ‘salience-induced reciprocity’ – i.e., the temporary 
reciprocity in response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. 
The theory and evidence in this article extend the understanding of performance and effort 
dynamics in incentive plans, and they offer new inroads into studying temporality in the 
functioning of HR practices. First, we contribute to a more complete theory of the performance 
effects of incentive plans, by arguing and showing that salience-induced responses to received 
incentive payments constitute an additional channel, distinct from reward expectancy, through 
which incentive plans can have their effects. In so doing, our study also introduces a novel 
mechanism – salience-induced reciprocity – plausibly underpinning the resultant performance 
dynamics. Second, while effort dynamics in incentive plans have been traced to time-varying 
incentive pressure or external interventions that make incentives salient, we show that distinct 
dynamics can also be traced to incentive payments, a routine component of any incentive plan. 
Finally, while time and temporal dynamics seem fundamental to understanding the functioning of 
HR practices, dynamics remain understudied in the HR literature. We extend this literature with a 
theory of temporal performance dynamics and we introduce and implement multivariate time-
series methods to examine such dynamics in longitudinal data on an incentive plan. 
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INCENTIVE PLANS AND PERFORMANCE 
Employees are typically expected to expend effort in ways that improve outcomes of relevance 
to their employers. Yet the interests of employees and employers may not align, and effort can be 
difficult to observe and verify, so that a core managerial challenge is to ensure that employees are 
motivated to act in their employers’ interests (Holmström 1979). Both economic and psychological 
theories have long suggested that tying employees’ pay to performance constitutes one viable way 
of increasing the alignment of interests between employees and their employers, and organizations 
indeed employ a wide variety of pay-for-performance systems (Gerhart et al. 2009). Here, our 
focus is on one such system – the incentive plan – through which an employer periodically gives 
employees incentive payments for their performance on clearly demarcated tasks, according to a 
pre-agreed, contractually specified formula. This contract supplies employees with incentives, by 
transparently stipulating ex ante the specific amount at which the employer promises to later 
compensate each ‘unit’ of task performance. Such units can be measures of both the quantity and 
quality of employees’ output (Lazear 1986), and incentive payments can be a linear or nonlinear 
function of task performance (Prendergast 1999). Two familiar examples of an incentive plan so 
defined are individual piece-rate and commission plans. 
The Role of Reward Expectancy 
Accumulated empirical evidence reveals that, on average, performance tends to be higher 
under incentive plans compared to flat or hourly wages (Banker et al. 1996; Delaney & Huselid 
1996; Kahn, Silva, & Ziliak 2001; Lavy 2009; Lazear 2000; Locke et al. 1980; Shearer 2004; 
Stajkovic & Luthans 1997). The primary theories in the pay-for-performance literature, agency 
theory and expectancy theory (Gerhart & Milkovich 1990; Nyberg et al. 2016), would attribute this 
result to the reward expectancy created by incentives, which derive from the mere fact that an 
incentive plan and accompanying contract are in place. Specifically, insofar as incentives permit 
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the credible expectation that current performance generates a matching future reward that 
outweighs the cost of effort, employees will be motivated to exert effort to perform well (Lawler 
1973; Prendergast 1999). Thus, once an employer introduces an incentive plan, employees respond 
rationally, by adjusting their effort in a forward-looking manner, proportional to the level of 
expectancy for future rewards induced by the plan’s incentives. By implication, both theories 
predict that the effectiveness of incentive plans can be traced to employees’ credible expectation 
that sufficiently desirable rewards will follow. 
Given its emphasis on the role of incentives and reward expectancy in shaping employees’ 
motivational states, available research on incentive plans has mostly abstracted away from the role 
of incentive payments. In pay-for-performance systems other than incentive plans, such as 
discretionary bonus or stock-option plans (e.g., Cappelli et al. 2020; Kahn & Sherer 1990; Nyberg 
et al. 2016; Park & Sturman 2016), employees face uncertainty regarding how much a unit of 
individual performance will eventually be (deemed) worth. Yet in incentive plans, the contract 
transparently links performance to incentive payments in a deterministic and predictable way, so 
that a clear line of sight exists between performance and expected pay. Consequently, the (implicit) 
assumption has been that incentive payments will periodically occur, though with the primary 
purpose of settling the outstanding balance between prior employee performance and the pledged 
compensation owed in return by the employer. 
At first blush, this assumption justifies the familiar focus on incentives and reward expectancy, 
and the abstraction away from incentive payments and their possible consequences. After all, since 
incentive payments are always commensurate with pre-agreed incentives, it stands to reason that 
an incentive payment will not leave employees with residual feelings of surprise, obligation, or 
inequity. So construed, in an ongoing incentive plan, incentives drive performance through 
employees’ reward expectancy, while periodic incentive payments should not themselves generate 
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temporary changes in subsequent performance.2 This implication, emerging directly from the 
prevailing theory of incentive plans, constitutes the null hypothesis against which next we propose 
a salience-based theory of incentive payments and their effects on performance dynamics. 
The Role of Received Incentive Payments 
Agency and expectancy theories accord employees the forward-looking ability to anticipate 
the benefits of their actions in light of a given incentive contract. We do not doubt that such a 
proactive logic can play a role in explaining the performance of an incentive plan. Yet, by focusing 
on incentives and the concomitant expectancy of future incentive payments as the source of 
employee motivation, these theories underemphasize the possibility that the eventual receipt of 
payment may have performance consequences of its own. Indeed, much like behavior can be 
proactively strategic and so driven by expected outcomes, as agency and expectancy theories 
assume, it can also be reactively responsive and so driven experientially by relevant stimuli. We 
argue that periodic incentive payments plausibly constitute such stimuli and elucidate how 
employees’ reactive responses to incentive payments can affect performance dynamics. 
Any incentive plan has at least two related components, as it encompasses incentives and 
incentive payments. For as long as an incentive plan is in use, incentives exist in a pre-agreed form 
and so are present continuously. In contrast, incentive payments are, by their very nature, time 
variant because they are discrete, discontinuous compensation events that occur only periodically. 
In line with this observation, we conceptualize an incentive payment as a recurring temporal 
marker, meaning it is a recurring event that stands out to employees amongst other moments in 
time where no such payment occurs. 
In their rather rational depiction of employee decision making, both agency and expectancy 
theories assume that, at any point in time, employees pay full attention to the current and future 
expected costs and benefits when making decisions regarding the supply of effort (Lawler 1973; 
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Prendergast 1999; Wabha & House 1974). Yet, the fact that attention is a limited resource 
(Kahneman 1973) raises the possibility that an incentive payment, in its role as a recurring temporal 
marker, can periodically bring such costs and benefits into sharper focus, much like the receipt of 
an electricity bill would periodically bring into sharper focus the marginal cost of electricity 
consumption (Gilbert & Graff Zivin 2014). Thus, incentive payments may serve more than their 
primary purpose of rewarding prior performance; they may also constitute stimuli that periodically 
make the incentive plan more salient to employees. 
Various studies underline the idea that the salience of organizational practices can vary, so that 
one might stand out and draw more attention. For example, Bowen and Ostroff (2004) suggested 
that practices may differ in how visible they are to employees, and Garg et al. (2021) introduced 
the related notion of HR salience, meaning “the prominence of an HR practice in an employee’s 
cognitive field relative to other HR practices” (p. 8). The salience of a practice may also vary over 
time, so that it stands out to different degrees at different points in time. While salience may 
increase when material changes to a practice are introduced (e.g., Jayaraman, Ray, & de Véricourt 
2016), variations in salience can also occur when the inner workings of a practice remain identical. 
For example, Englmaier et al. (2017), who studied an incentive plan at a large agricultural 
producer, argued that the incentive plan became more salient once employees received an 
unobtrusive note regarding the piece rate at the beginning of a shift, even though the note supplied 
no new material information and left the incentive plan unchanged. Thus, following our conception 
of incentive payments as recurring temporal markers, we propose that an incentive plan will be 
more salient to employees at and for some time after the moment at which they receive an incentive 
payment, even though the plan’s incentives remain unchanged. 
The salience of an organizational practice is important because it makes a practice stand out. 
Thus, it directs employee attention and affects the degree to which information regarding that 
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practice will be accessed and cognitively processed (DellaVigna 2009; Fiske & Taylor 2013; Garg 
et al. 2021; Ocasio 2011). By implication, the salience of a practice can determine how employees 
respond to that practice. In our context, how then might employees respond if incentive payments 
periodically make the incentive plan more salient? On the view that an employment relationship 
has both an economic and a social dimension (Baron & Kreps 2013; Shore & Barksdale 1998; Tsui, 
Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli 1997), we propose that employee responses may involve both incentivized 
and unincentivized outcomes, through two distinct mechanisms that we call, respectively, 
‘salience-induced refocusing’ and ‘salience-induced reciprocity’. 
Salience-Induced Refocusing. The intermittency of incentive payments drives a temporal 
wedge between employee performance and payment. This disconnect implies that employees may 
not always pay full attention to the marginal net benefit of task performance when they make 
decisions regarding the supply of effort. Thus, insofar as an incentive payment enhances the 
salience of the incentive plan, more attention may be drawn narrowly to behaviors prioritized in 
the incentive contract, so that the incentive payment simply reminds employees of the incentivized 
tasks. This way, like the unobtrusive reminder regarding the piece rate in Englmaier et al. (2017), 
the incentive payment leads employees to refocus their attention on, and become more responsive 
to, the incentives they face. By implication, the motivation to reinforce incentivized behaviors 
increases, so that employees’ performance on incentivized tasks improves. This first mechanism, 
salience-induced refocusing, operates insofar as a periodic incentive payment temporarily draws 
more employee attention to the economic dimension of their employment relationship. 
These arguments imply that incentive payments, as recurring temporal markers, increase the 
salience of pre-agreed incentives at and for some time after the payment receipt, which periodically 
increases performance on incentivized tasks. Due to the discrete, discontinuous nature of incentive 
payments, the transience of human memory, and concomitant lapses in attention (Schacter 1999; 
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Tversky & Kahneman 1974), we argue that a boost in incentivized task performance associated 
with the stimulus provided by an incentive payment will be temporary, so that performance always 
eventually reverts to the pre-payment level. 
Hypothesis 1: In an ongoing incentive plan, incentivized performance increases following an 
incentive payment, and then reverts to the pre-payment level. 
Salience-Induced Reciprocity. While enhanced salience of the incentive plan may draw 
employee attention narrowly to the incentives they face, it may also increase attention broadly to 
the fact that the employer offers an incentive plan as an HR practice. Because an incentive plan 
gives employees some control over their income, the practice may be perceived as a benefit offered 
by the employer (Akerlof 1982), which can elicit various positive reactions. For example, several 
studies have shown that employees working under an incentive plan (or similar) report higher levels 
of job satisfaction (Artz 2008; Green & Heywood 2008) and a greater commitment to and trust in 
their employer (Ogbonnaya, Daniels, & Nielsen 2017; Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellella 2009; Shore 
& Barksdale 1998). To the extent that an incentive payment periodically reinvigorates such positive 
perceptions and affect, employees may offer an in-kind response and reciprocate, by exerting more 
effort to fulfill perceived reciprocal obligations towards their employer (Tsui et al. 1997). 
Under salience-induced refocusing, employees pay more attention to incentivized tasks and, 
thus, the economic and more explicit dimension of the employment relationship. Instead, increased 
attention to the incentive plan as a perceived benefit emphasizes the implicit contract, which 
comprises the broader social dimension of the employment relationship (Rousseau 1989). Within 
this social dimension, shorter-term economic motives can take a back seat to other considerations, 
such as the good will, loyalty, and commitment an employee may portray in response to benefits 
offered by the employer and, possibly, in anticipation of the recognition this may in return confer 
onto the employee (Cropanzano & Mitchell 2005). Thus, given the more diffuse nature of the social 
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dimension, employees’ responses to the enhanced salience of the ‘incentive-plan-as-benefit’ could 
extend beyond incentivized behaviors, to other behaviors valued by the employer (Coyle-Shapiro 
& Conway 2005; Tsui et al. 1997). For example, employees may attend to the broader needs of the 
organization and improve performance on unincentivized tasks if they know them to be important 
for the performance of the organization, even if such unincentivized tasks generate no immediate 
returns to employees (Hom et al. 2009). This second mechanism, salience-induced reciprocity, 
operates insofar as a periodic incentive payment temporarily draws more employee attention to the 
social dimension of their employment relationship. 
Under salience-induced reciprocity, incentive payments, as recurring temporal markers, 
temporarily heighten the salience of the ‘incentive-plan-as-benefit’, which periodically increases 
performance on unincentivized tasks. Nevertheless, as under salience-induced refocusing, the 
discrete, discontinuous nature of incentive payments, the transience of human memory, and 
concomitant lapses in attention (Schacter 1999; Tversky & Kahneman 1974) lead us to expect that 
such a periodic boost in performance beyond incentivized tasks will also be temporary, so that in 
the end performance always returns to the pre-payment level. 
Hypothesis 2: In an ongoing incentive plan, unincentivized performance increases following 
an incentive payment, and then reverts to the pre-payment level. 
Summary of Predicted Dynamics. Figure 1 illustrates, in stylized form, the temporal dynamics 
implied by our hypotheses. The figure shows time on the horizontal axis and performance on the 
vertical axis. “Performance trend”, a solid gray line, runs the length of the figure, representing how 
performance develops over time once the incentive plan is ongoing. This trend can have its own 
dynamics (e.g., due to seasonality), yet we show it as a horizontal line, so that the broken line, 
illustrating our hypotheses, shows deviations from the performance trend due to incentive 
payments. In the figure, an incentive payment increases performance, which subsequently declines 
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until the next incentive payment stimulates another temporary increase in performance, and so on. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Duration of Performance Responses. The duration of the temporary increase in performance 
following an incentive payment may vary across outcomes, for example, depending on the extent 
to which they are under employees’ immediate control. In general, employee responses to an 
incentive payment likely follow the payment fairly readily on behaviors over which they have more 
control (e.g., picking fruit or answering a phone call). And such responses would wear off before 
the next payment arrives, provided that the payment interval is large relative to the time it takes to 
complete a ‘unit’ of task performance. On outcomes outside of employees’ immediate control (e.g., 
sales performance), the incentive-payment effect on performance dynamics might (but need not) 
be delayed and last longer. Such possible heterogeneity in response duration constitutes an open 
empirical question and we revisit this issue after presenting our empirical results. 
METHOD 
Setting and Sample 
Our empirical study examines how incentive payments for a firm’s customer-support 
employees affect performance dynamics. Customer-support employees are critically important 
because often they are the only point of contact between a firm and its customers, certainly now 
that many firms predominantly use the Internet to offer their products and/or services. This 
category of “online firms” represents a sizeable and growing share of the revenues in many 
industries. In U.K. retail, for example, more than 85% of online sales and over 40% of all sales in 
early 2019 derived from businesses without a permanent physical presence (ONS 2019). Typically, 
current or prospective customers engage with an online firm’s website, through which they can 
choose to interact with customer-support employees via media such as phone, email, and online 
chat. Fast responses and high service quality are crucial to such firms (e.g., Oldroyd, McElheran, 
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& Elkington 2011) and so, apart from their base salaries, customer-support employees often are 
subject to output-based incentives and individual incentive payments (Batt 2002). 
Here, we perform a quantitative analysis of a single firm, consistent with prior empirical 
studies on the consequences of incentive plans (e.g., Asch 1990; Banker et al. 1996; Larkin 2014; 
Lazear 2000). We collected data from WebCo (a pseudonym), a private Greek online firm offering 
web hosting and domain name registration services to over 60,000 customers across more than 100 
countries. Accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, WebCo is 
one of the leading domain name registrars in Greece, employing between 20 and 35 individuals 
during our sampling window. Because around 95% of all European firms in this industry (NACE 
category J63.1) employed fewer than 10, and 99% fewer than 50, employees (Eurostat 2014), 
WebCo was large among its peers. The firm received several customer-service awards, including 
Team of the Year for customer support, and was voted among the Best Workplaces in Greece. 
We interacted extensively with WebCo’s management and personnel, and negotiated access 
to weekly data on phone calls, emails, and chats, customer feedback, incentive payments, demand 
drivers, and sales performance spanning well over three years. The resulting firm-level data set for 
our empirical analysis spans 169 weeks (i.e., 39 months or 13 quarters), from January 3, 2011 to 
March 30, 2014. This sampling period covers a time when WebCo’s incentive plan was ongoing, 
employees believed that their individual performance would continue to be observed and rewarded 
in line with the incentive contract, and the nature and content of customer-support tasks were stable. 
We present our main analyses using weekly data (N=169), which is the most granular aggregation 
at which we have complete data for all key variables. Weekly aggregation is appropriate because 
this is between four and five times the frequency at which incentive payments are calculated and 
settled, thus allowing us to trace dynamics between payments (Colicev & Pauwels 2020). 
WebCo constitutes an empirical site particularly well suited for our purposes. Key constructs 
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are consistently and longitudinally observable and the bounded scope of WebCo’s activities 
ensures that the link between incentive payments and performance can plausibly be inferred from 
available data. Also, WebCo’s customer-support employees are subject to linear and stable 
incentives, which generates a time-invariant incentive pressure. By design, this eliminates as a 
confounding force the intertemporal effort reallocation and concomitant performance dynamics 
often observed under time-varying incentives, such as when firms reward employees only once 
they reach a quota (e.g., Asch 1990), or when incentives change across evaluation periods (e.g., 
Brahm & Poblete 2018). Next, incentive payments are based on explicit criteria directly tied to 
individual performance, and employees have continual access to their performance data, so they 
have an accurate sense of the magnitude of upcoming incentive payments. Thus, responses to 
incentive payments are attributable to the act of payment rather than the revelation of recent 
performance, which by design rules out reinforcement learning due to incentive payment. Finally, 
while incentive payments were calculated by calendar month, for idiosyncratic reasons the 
payments occurred at irregular intervals of three to seven weeks. This feature is crucial for us to be 
able to separate incentive-payment effects from the monthly evaluation cycle. 
The time-series nature of our data offers additional advantages. First, the longitudinal analysis 
of one firm as it progresses through time exclusively exploits temporal variation in each variable 
and uses the firm as its own control, and so it holds constant time-invariant firm characteristics, 
such as the firm’s baseline reputation in the market, industry, geographic location, and 
organizational culture. Second, our longitudinal data set affords the use of time-series methods 
designed to examine temporal dynamics, our core focus. 
Dependent Variables 
Customer support at WebCo consists in a set of employees answering queries by current or 
prospective customers, all who themselves initiate contact with the firm. Thus, WebCo measured 
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the performance of customer-support employees based on the quantity of answered phone calls, 
and the quantity and perceived quality of answered emails and chats. Due to challenges in linking 
interactions with customer support to eventual orders (which customers placed on WebCo’s 
website), sales performance was not incentivized. However, by offering advice regarding what and 
how to order, customer-support employees played a crucial role in the sales process: They were 
tasked with giving customized assistance regarding suitable products and their features, while also 
clarifying the order process where necessary. Thus, whether a customer seeking out interaction 
with WebCo through phone, email, or chat eventually placed an order, as well as the nature of that 
order, depended critically on the effort of a customer-support employee during that interaction. The 
HR manager emphasized this connection, when explaining why the incentive plan was adopted in 
the first place: “We were…expecting better quality in customer service, which…leads to 
an…increase in sales.” As such, we measure performance as the weekly performance of customer-
support employees on the specific tasks incentivized through the incentive plan (Hypothesis 1) and 
unincentivized weekly sales performance (Hypothesis 2). 
Task Performance. WebCo counted the number of phone calls attended, and we drew 
aggregated weekly numbers from the firm’s telephone records. Mindful of the fact that a count of 
attended calls represents a mere quantity measure, the management briefed the customer-support 
employees on the importance of (unmeasured) call quality for sales performance. While employees 
were told that phone calls might be monitored at any time, the firm did not systematically collect 
information on the contents of individual phone calls. Consistent with WebCo’s measurement, we 
capture employee effectiveness in dealing with emails and chats by counting the respective weekly 
numbers of answered emails and chats. The firm used emoticons to gauge customer feedback and 
rewarded employees for each received smiley. Thus, we too count positive feedback as the 
respective weekly numbers of email and chat encounters receiving a smiley face from customers. 
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We combine these five measures into one task performance variable, weekly Task 
performance (TPt), which is the first principal factor of the five measures, thus accounting for 
differences in the base rates of phone, email, and chat interactions. The index has a McDonald’s 
(1999) ω equal to 0.86, suggesting satisfactory reliability. We aggregate across employees because 
they work independently, and support requests keep up with the available capacity to respond. 
Thus, one employee’s effort does not reduce the rate at which another can earn incentive payments, 
so that aggregation generates a valid and readily interpretable task performance measure. 
Sales Performance. We measure sales performance using sales data drawn from WebCo’s 
financial records. Specifically, the variable Sales revenues (St) captures weekly revenues in 
constant (January 2011) euros. In additional analyses, we substitute Sales revenues with, 
respectively, the number of products and sales revenues per product. Number of products is the 
number of domains sold in a given week, and Sales revenues per product is the average revenue 
per sold domain in a week, in constant (January 2011) euros. These measures help disentangle 
whether potential sales responses are due to changes in product quantity or revenues per product. 
Independent Variable 
Consistent with Prendergast (1999: 13), incentive payments at WebCo were a linear 
combination of the five performance measures that constitute Task performance, with each of five 
measures carrying its own weight (i.e., its own “piece rate”).3 We use data from financial records 
to measure Incentive payment (IPt) as the amount of incentive payment in a given week, expressed 
in constant (January 2011) euros. WebCo settled incentive payments retrospectively and at the 
same time for all customer-support employees, and payment occurred at intervals of three to seven 
weeks. Payment intervals were asynchronous to the monthly calendar cycle, and payment followed 
task performance with a small but variable delay. For example, incentive payments related to task 
performance in February 2012 were settled on March 8, 2012, while those related to May 2012 
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were settled on June 29, 2012. This idiosyncratic feature of the incentive plan contributes towards 
identifying the dynamic response of performance to incentive payments. We attribute incentive 
payments to weeks in which payment found place and set Incentive payment to zero in the other 
weeks. Incentive payments averaged around 10% of employees’ monthly base salaries, which 
passes the 5-7% threshold above which employees are more likely to perceive a pay change as 
meaningful (Mitra, Tenhiälä, & Shaw 2016; Worley, Bowen, & Lawler 1992). 
Control Variables 
Apart from the theory-testing variables, our analysis also includes several control variables. 
Due to the Great Recession, many businesses opened or moved online to limit fixed costs and so 
required domain name and web hosting services. Thus, WebCo offered good job security, which 
resulted in a virtually unchanged set of customer-support employees: One person was added mid-
2011, yet no one exited customer support in 2011-2014. Expansion (EDt) is a dummy set to one in 
and after the week in which one member was added to customer support. 
At WebCo, both task and sales performance directly depend on demand and so we account for 
a rich set of demand drivers. The market-oriented activities that online firms use to influence 
demand typically cover both paid channels, such as search advertising (Wiesel, Pauwels, & Arts 
2011), and channels the firm ‘owns’, such as accounts in social media platforms like Twitter (Gong, 
Zhang, Zhao, & Jiang 2017). WebCo engaged in search advertising through Google AdWords, and 
in social media activity through Twitter. Using data from WebCo’s financial records and Google 
AdWords account, we measure AdWords (AWt) as the weekly amount of money committed to 
Google AdWords, expressed in constant (January 2011) euros. We use Twitter archives to measure 
Tweets (Tt) as the firm’s weekly number of ‘tweets’ on Twitter. 
While demand depends on factors under a firm’s direct control, it also depends on external 
forces. Holiday (HDt) is a dummy capturing whether a given week is part of the two weeks of 
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public holidays in August, the weeks of Christmas and New Year, or the week following Easter 
Sunday. To account for turn-of-the-month effects, End of month (EoMDt) and Beginning of month 
(BoMDt) are dummies for whether a given week is, respectively, the last full week or first week of 
the calendar month. Industry growth (It) captures the worldwide number of new domain name 
registrations in a given week, to account for expansion of the domain name market. We collected 
data on new domain name registrations from Verisign’s quarterly domain name industry briefs 
(Verisign 2016) and attribute quarterly numbers to weeks in equal proportions. Finally, we control 
for seasonal demand effects with a vector of quarterly dummies (QDqt) for Quarter 2 (April-June), 
Quarter 3 (July-September), and Quarter 4 (October-December). Table 1 shows summary statistics 
and bivariate correlations for all variables in raw form (i.e., prior to detrending). 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Modeling Approach 
Our goal is to identify the impact of incentive payments on the dynamics of performance, 
which generates several modeling requirements. First, the model must allow for both immediate 
and delayed effects of incentive payments on performance. Second, it should allow for a dynamic 
counterfactual capturing how performance would have developed had incentive payment not 
occurred. Finally, the model must account for the fact that not just performance, but also Incentive 
payment and other variables, can be endogenous, meaning they may be explained by their own past 
or the past of other variables. Such endogeneity may be due to factors like reverse causation (e.g., 
past performance affecting current incentive payments through its effect on employee morale), 
inertia (e.g., anchoring current advertising expenditures in last week’s expenditures), or resourcing 
trade-offs (e.g., reducing advertising expenditures when incentive payments are settled). 
Based on these requirements, we use a vector autoregression (VAR) modeling approach 
(Colicev & Pauwels 2020; Lütkepohl 2005). This multivariate time-series approach is well-
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established in adjacent literatures, including macroeconomics (e.g., Sims 1980) and marketing 
science (e.g., Dekimpe & Hanssens 1995; Wiesel et al. 2011), and ideally suited for our focus on 
incentive payments and performance dynamics: It allows for both immediate and delayed 
performance effects; it supplies a dynamic counterfactual performance baseline; and it allows us 
to model time-series endogeneity. Our implementation of this modeling approach has four steps: 
(i) A VAR model requires an a priori decision on which variables will be treated as 
“endogenous” and so modeled as longitudinally interdependent with other variables, and 
which variables will instead be assumed “exogenous”. 
(ii) VAR is based on linear regression and requires that the variables chosen as endogenous in 
step (i) are stationary, meaning they must fluctuate around a fixed mean. Stationarity is 
essential to avoid spurious regression results (Granger & Newbold 1974). Thus, we perform 
unit-root tests on the endogenous variables to assess whether each is stationary or evolving, 
which will determine whether transformations are necessary to achieve stationarity prior to 
model estimation in step (iii). For example, if a unit-root test reveals that a variable fluctuates 
around a trending mean, then we must detrend that variable before estimation. 
(iii) Using linear regression, we estimate the VAR model of dynamic relations among the 
endogenous variables, while accounting for all exogenous variables. 
(iv) Based on the estimated VAR model, we subsequently evaluate our hypotheses by quantifying 
the direction, dynamics, and precision of immediate and delayed changes in performance 
attributable to a periodic incentive payment. 
We cover steps (i)-(iii) directly in the below, after which we introduce the methodology for step 
(iv). We present the implementation of step (iv), hypothesis testing, in the Results section. 
Step (i): Choosing Endogenous and Exogenous Variables. Task performance and Sales 
revenues are our two main dependent variables and so we naturally treat them as endogenous. Yet, 
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VAR also allows variables traditionally labeled as “independent” and “control” variables to be 
modeled statistically as endogenous. We selected endogenous and exogenous variables based on 
several considerations. First, all external demand drivers (Holiday, End of month, Beginning of 
month, Industry growth, and the quarter dummies) by nature are exogenous. Second, because 
Expansion changes only once, it is deterministic from a time-series perspective and so we treat it 
as exogenous. Third, we treat Incentive payment, our key predictor, as endogenous because it is a 
delayed function of past task performance, the latter which is itself endogenous. Finally, the two 
remaining variables, AdWords and Tweets, are demand drivers under WebCo’s direct control and 
investments in either may depend, for example, on past investments, incentive payments, or recent 
performance. Thus, we treat them as endogenous. 
Step (ii): Unit-Root Tests. We perform unit-root tests to assess whether each of the five 
endogenous variables (i.e., Task performance, Sales revenues, Incentive payment, AdWords, and 
Tweets) are stationary or evolving. A stationary variable is said to have no unit root, while an 
evolving variable has a unit root, implying it does not revert to a fixed or trending mean. Table 2 
shows test statistics for the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test that accounts for an 
intercept and a deterministic trend. The tests reject the unit-root null hypothesis for all variables, 
and in virtually all cases small p-values suggest we can reject the null of no deterministic trend. 
One inference from these tests is that the two performance outcomes, Task performance and Sales 
revenues, are stationary around a linear trend and so both always revert to their trending means, so 
that any performance dynamics attributable to incentive payments will be temporary. 
Three issues require further explanation. First, the unit-root test for AdWords concerns the 
period starting January 2012, when WebCo adopted AdWords. In the VAR model (step (iii)), we 
account for this one-off increase in AdWords through AdWords used (ADt), a dummy capturing 
whether, in each week, the firm uses Google AdWords. 
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Second, in Table 2, Tweets is not as inconsistent with the unit-root null hypothesis as the other 
variables (p=0.068). This might be because the time series for Tweets shows an eight-week period 
of more intense activity in 2011, during which WebCo posted an average of roughly 138 tweets 
per week, compared to about 40 per week throughout the remainder of the sampling window. Such 
a temporary shift of the mean could errantly suggest a variable is evolving (Perron 1989). Thus, 
we retested for a unit root in Tweets using a variation of the ADF test accounting for the sudden 
increase and subsequent drop in the level of Tweets between end of July and mid-September 2011 
(Clemente, Montañés, & Reyes 1998), which resulted in a t-statistic of -5.672 (0.025<p<0.05; 
Clemente et al. [1998] provide the relevant critical values). Thus, Tweets is stationary provided we 
account for the temporary shift in its mean. In the VAR model (step (iii)), we achieve this by 
adjusting for Tweets intensive (TDt), a dummy capturing whether a week is fallen in the short period 
of relatively intensive Twitter activity. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
Third and finally, all five endogenous variables are stationary around a deterministically-
trending mean and so we enter them in detrended levels into the VAR model. Specifically, we 
remove the effect of a deterministic, linear trend t from each of the endogenous variables Yi, so that 
their detrended levels are simply the respective residuals yi,t of Yi,t = c0 + c1t + yi,t. 
Step (iii): VAR Model. The unit-root tests suggest we can specify a VAR model with five 
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where μ are intercepts; the variables are as defined above; t indexes weeks; β, γ, and δ are the 
parameters to be estimated; the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals 𝜖 captures the 
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instantaneous, same-week relations among the endogenous variables; and k is the ‘order’ of the 
system – i.e., the number of included time lags. In our empirical estimation, we set k to 1 based on 
an evaluation of information criteria (e.g., Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion). By way of 
example, with a lag length of one week, the Sales revenues equation in the above system becomes: 
St = μS + β21
1 TPt−1 + β22
1 St−1 + β23
1 IPt−1 + β24
1 AWt−1 + β25
1 Tt−1 + γ21EDt + γ22HDt + γ23EoMDt +
γ24BoMDt + γ25It + γ26ADt + γ27TDt + δ21QD2t + δ22QD3t + δ23QD4t + ϵS,t .            (2)
5 
The system in Equation (1) implies similar equations for the other four endogenous variables. 
Therefore, temporal variance in each endogenous variable is a function of the variable’s own 
lagged value, the lagged values of all other endogenous variables, a vector of exogenous variables, 
and an error term, and so the VAR model captures the full dynamic system of relations among the 
variables. We estimate the system in Equation (1) using conventional seemingly unrelated 
regression and Appendix A shows the point estimates. 
Step (iv): Hypotheses Testing. The full dynamic performance effects of incentive payments 
cannot be inferred from single coefficients in the regressions comprising the VAR model (e.g., 
Lütkepohl 2005). Instead, we follow the prevailing approach in the time-series literature and use 
generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) to establish the direction, dynamics, and precision 
of the incentive-payment effects on performance (Pesaran & Shin 1998). A GIRF isolates the 
differential impact of an exogenous ‘impulse’ (e.g., a one-standard-deviation increase) in a 
predictor on an outcome variable. Based on the VAR coefficients from step (iii), two predictions 
are calculated for each of the two dependent variables: One is based on the information set without 
the impulse in the hypothesis-testing variable, and the other accounts for the impulse. The 
difference between these two predictions then supplies the GIRF – i.e., the incremental, week-to-
week effect on the outcome due to a simulated impulse in the predictor. 
To test our specific hypotheses, we focus on the effect of incentive payments on task and sales 
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performance. For each week for which a prediction is generated, the GIRF enumerates how an 
impulse in incentive payment affects these performance outcomes compared to their dynamic 
counterfactual performance baselines. If the GIRFs show that performance changes following an 
impulse in incentive payment, then performance is reactively responsive to the payment, implying 
that the payment may be viewed as contributing to performance (Lütkepohl 2005). 
To account for uncertainty surrounding the point estimates for the weekly impulse responses, 
we derive response standard errors through Monte-Carlo simulations with 1000 iterations. We 
apply two-standard-error bounds to the point estimates, following the VAR literature (e.g., Sims & 
Zha 1999), as well as standard practice in VAR applications in economics and finance (e.g., Bloom 
2009; Kelly & Jiang 2014) and marketing science (e.g., Wiesel et al. 2011). When graphing the 
GIRFs, the horizontal axis captures the dynamic counterfactual performance baseline absent the 
impulse in Incentive payment. Thus, we consider the estimated values of the weekly impulse 
responses to be progressively less consistent with the null hypothesis the further this horizontal 
axis falls outside the error bounds surrounding the impulse responses. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Evidence 
Figure 2 shows average weekly performance surrounding the weeks in which incentive 
payments found place, aggregated across the 169-week sampling window. The horizontal axis 
depicts the time from two weeks before to two weeks after the incentive payment, and the vertical 
axis depicts average weekly performance. To permit a comparison between the two performance 
outcomes, we normalized both performance lines around the respective average task or sales 
performance during t-2 to t+2, and we show deviations from the average in standard deviations. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
The figure shows that Task performance increases only marginally, while Sales revenues 
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shows a clear pattern and is relatively lower before the incentive payment yet increases and then 
decreases in the weeks that follow the payment. These simple averages suggest a pattern for Task 
performance that is more consistent with the null hypothesis rather than Hypothesis 1, while Sales 
revenues behaves in ways inconsistent with the null yet consistent with Hypothesis 2. As per 
modeling step (iv), we next turn to a multivariate assessment of our two hypotheses, where for 
inference we rely on GIRFs derived from the empirical estimates of Equation (1). 
Hypotheses Tests 
Task Performance. To test Hypothesis 1, Figure 3 shows the GIRF capturing the response of 
Task performance (in standard deviations) to a simulated one-standard deviation impulse in 
Incentive payment. The horizontal axis, representing the counterfactual performance baseline, 
consistently lies well within the error bounds of the performance response and so we find no 
evidence of meaningful changes in task performance attributable to the incentive payment. 
Separately, a Granger (1969) causality test did not reveal that Incentive payment contains unique 
information about subsequent Task performance (Chi2[1]=0.11, p=0.740), and so we find no 
evidence suggesting predictive causality from Incentive payment to Task performance. 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
We also examined unreported VAR specifications disaggregating Task performance into (a) a 
quantity (numbers of calls, emails, and chats) and a quality (emails and chats with positive 
customer feedback) component and, more granularly, (b) its five constituent measures. Both these 
supplementary analyses allow for possible multi-tasking trade-offs, which could lead to the 
substitution of effort between quantity and quality narrowly, or among the five tasks broadly 
(Holmström & Milgrom 1991). Yet even when directly modeling such possible trade-offs, no 
systematic differences existed in how disaggregated measures of task performance responded to 
the incentive payment. For each we consistently found a null effect like that shown in Figure 3 (see 
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Figures B1 and B2, respectively, in Appendix B).6 
At WebCo, customer-support employees work independently and the demand for customer 
support is abundant, so that one employee’s effort is independent of the potential effort and 
incentive payments of others. Thus, the effect in Figure 3 does not reflect demand constraints, 
which would force one employee’s increased task performance to be associated with a reduction 
in another’s. However, heterogeneity may exist in how employees respond to the receipt of an 
incentive payment, which could occur in offsetting ways that accumulate to the null effect shown 
in Figure 3. We managed to obtain some individual-level data, which suggested time-invariant 
differences in the level of task performance, while not suggesting evidence of systematic individual 
heterogeneity in the performance response to incentive payments. 
Finally, we explored whether task performance revealed more granular dynamic responses to 
Incentive payment in the days after payment. Specifically, using the sample of all 1183 days (i.e., 
169 weeks × 7 days), we fitted a VAR model of the form: 
𝐘t = 𝚨 + ∑ Φi
k
i=1 𝐘t−i + Ψ𝐗t + 𝚪t ,                      (3) 
where A is a 2 × 1 vector of intercepts; Yt is a 2 × 1 vector of endogenous variables (i.e., Task 
performance and Incentive payment, the latter which is ‘1’ on days of incentive payment and ‘0’ 
otherwise); Xt is a vector of control variables comprising fixed effects for weekdays, weeks of the 
year, years, and days of office closure; Γt is a 2 × 1 matrix of residuals; t indexes days; and k is the 
number of included time lags, which we set to seven based on an evaluation of information criteria. 
As the GIRF in Appendix C shows, this analysis does not imply meaningful deviations from the 
task-performance baseline either. Thus, none of our analyses reveal incentive-payment associations 
with the dynamics of Task performance, and so we cannot reject the null hypothesis in favor of 
Hypothesis 1, meaning we find no evidence of salience-induced refocusing. 
Sales Revenues. To test Hypothesis 2, Figure 4 shows the GIRF capturing the response of 
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Sales revenues (in standard deviations) to a simulated one-standard deviation impulse in Incentive 
payment. The figure shows that an impulse in Incentive payment has an immediate (i.e., same-
week) effect on Sales revenues yet also subsequently improves performance in the following week, 
after which the impulse response wears out, so that performance becomes gradually 
indistinguishable from its baseline. Also, a test for Granger causality revealed that Incentive 
payment contains unique information about subsequent Sales revenues (Chi2[1]=8.12, p=0.004), 
which means that predictive causality exists from Incentive payment to Sales revenues. Finally, 
variance in Incentive payment explains 5.2% of the time-series variance in Sales revenues, which 
is over 40% of the variance in Sales revenues not explained by its own past.7 Thus, while we did 
not find an effect of incentive payment on incentivized performance, we do find a temporary and 
positive effect on unincentivized sales performance, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
--- Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
What percentage of sales revenues is attributable to employees’ reactive responses to incentive 
payments? A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that incentive payments contribute about 
1.8% to total sales, which is the amount of euros spent on incentive payments multiplied by €4.60, 
the additional revenue per euro spent on such payments, divided by aggregate sales revenues. A 
similar calculation for Google AdWords, which contributes an estimated revenue of 0.51 euros per 
euro spent, reveals this percentage to be 1.6% of total sales.8 AdWords is a particularly useful 
comparison because online firms, like ours, view search advertising as an essential and effective 
tool to enhance revenues. Thus, the aggregate contribution of incentive payments to sales revenues 
is meaningful because it is comparable to that of search advertising, even though AdWords 
spending occurs weekly, while incentive payments occur only once every three to seven weeks. 
Alternative Model Specifications 
Before probing the mechanism underpinning the sales response (Figure 4), we assessed 
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robustness in three different specifications of Equation (1). First, we omitted AdWords and Tweets 
as endogenous demand drivers. Second, we extended the lag length k to two weeks, which allowed 
direct effects to carry across multiple weeks. This might occur if employees delay their response 
to the incentive payment, or if customers wait longer before making a purchase decision. Third, we 
incorporated the dispersion of incentive payments across employees (i.e., max. – min.) as a sixth 
endogenous variable. Payment dispersion may affect employee envy and morale through social 
comparison and could confound the incentive-payment effect (e.g., Nickerson & Zenger 2008; 
Shaw 2014). Across the three specifications, our inferences regarding the effects of Incentive 
payment on the dynamics of Task performance and Sales revenues remain fully intact. 
Probing the Mechanism underlying the Sales-Revenues Effect 
To examine in more detail the dynamic sales response to an incentive payment (Figure 4), we 
exchanged Sales revenues for the Number of products and Sales revenues per product and twice 
re-estimated the VAR model in Equation (1). Figure 5 shows the resulting GIRFs for these 
alternative measures (in standard deviations) with respect to a one-standard deviation impulse in 
Incentive payment. The figure shows that the Number of products increases in the week following 
incentive payment, although the increase is short-lived. Sales revenues per product increases in the 
week in which the incentive payment is settled, it increases further afterwards, and returns more 
slowly to its baseline than Number of products. Thus, the sales effect of an incentive payment 
seems due mostly to a temporary increase in revenues per product, suggesting that the payment 
influences interactions with customers in ways that cannot be traced to the five incentivized tasks. 
--- Insert Figure 5 about here --- 
On average, customer phone calls arrived at almost 20 times the frequency of emails and over 
90 times the frequency of chats. Thus, based on volume as well as insights derived from our 
interviews with management and personnel, phone was likely an important medium through which 
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the temporary increase occurred in revenues per product, and thus aggregate Sales revenues. Such 
sales effects were not incentivized, yet customer-support employees were briefed and so aware that 
management deemed call quality important for sales; that such quality was not directly 
incentivized; yet that calls might be monitored at any time. Combined with the fact that employees 
at WebCo care about their employer’s esteem, the more informal incentive pressure surrounding 
call quality plausibly generated a response to incentive payment on that aspect of the set of tasks 
performed by the customer-support employees. 
While we do not have data directly capturing call content and quality, according to the HR and 
sales managers, as well as the customer-support employees, call duration is the closest available 
proxy, and it was understood that even slight changes in call duration could go a long way.9 To 
assess this channel more systematically, we obtained daily information on average call duration. 
Using the sample of all 1183 days, we re-estimated Equation (3) after substituting Average call 
duration for Task performance, where Average call duration is the average call duration in seconds, 
and we included lags up to four days based on an evaluation of information criteria.  
--- Insert Figure 6 about here --- 
The solid line in Figure 6 shows the GIRF capturing the daily response of Average call 
duration (in standard deviations) to an incentive payment. The figure shows a systematic increase 
and subsequent decrease in average call duration – a sizeable temporary burst readily following the 
incentive payment.10 A Granger causality test reinforced that predictive causality exists from 
Incentive payment to Average call duration (Chi2[4]=13.25, p=0.010), meaning that incentive 
payment explains variation in subsequent call duration that is not explained by lagged call duration 
or any of the other predictors. 
Consistent with the theory underpinning Hypothesis 2, our fieldwork reflects that the receipt 
of an incentive payment reminded employees not of the incentives so much as it increased attention 
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to the fact that the employer offered the incentive plan as a benefit – or, as one employee put it, 
“the initiative to provide something more…[the feeling that] your employer wants to give 
something back to you for the good job you’re doing. This is something…incentivizing for me.” 
Moreover, when asked why particularly unincentivized outcomes responded to the incentive 
payment, a different employee noted: “I am a team player, a ‘family’ member…[and] I am going 
to prove it to you guys, I am going to give more effort…it [is] mostly to help out the company.” 
What also surfaced was a hesitation to focus too overtly on incentivized tasks to the possible 
detriment of unincentivized tasks, not out of fear but to avoid letting down the employer: “our team 
wasn’t comprised of members that were doing it (improving the call experience) …not to lose their 
job or anything like that. I don’t think we ever had somebody on board that would have that kind 
of mentality…it’s about…I do not want to look bad to my employer.” 
Employees also referred to the greater emphasis they would temporarily place on probing 
customer needs and appropriate solutions, for example, when noting: “[we] are more eager to 
[give] a better service to the client and try harder to find what suits the [client] and what [are] 
actually their needs, and try to investigate more…try to provide the correct solution.” This insight 
led us to collect and hand-code other daily data on whether the firm’s tech team was involved in 
confirming appropriate customer solutions. Using these data, which were available from October 
2011 to June 2013 (N=647 days; ~92 weeks), we again re-estimated Equation (3) after substituting 
Tech team involvement for Task performance, where Tech team involvement is the number of times 
the tech team helped confirm customer solutions, and including lags up to three days. 
The broken line in Figure 6 shows the GIRF capturing the daily response of Tech team 
involvement (in standard deviations) to an incentive payment. The figure shows a systematic 
increase and subsequent decrease in tech team involvement – a sizeable temporary burst readily 
following the incentive payment that closely resembles the response of Average call duration. 
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Here, too, a Granger causality test underlined that predictive causality exists from Incentive 
payment to Tech team involvement (Chi2[3]=10.27, p=0.016), implying that incentive payment 
explains variation in subsequent tech team involvement that is not explained by lagged tech team 
involvement or any of the other predictors. 
Finally, we can now compare Figure 6 to Figures 4 and 5. Evidently, responses on intermediate 
outcomes – i.e., the duration of calls and involvement of the tech team – wear off more quickly 
than responses on dimensions of sales performance, the latter which are outside of employees’ 
immediate control. For example, after an interaction with customer support, customers can take 
time to deliberate before placing an order, and this period may vary across customers, so that sales 
performance on average lags the active involvement of customer-support employees. Thus, one 
might plausibly infer that employees’ degree of control over outcomes matters for the duration of 
temporary performance responses. 
Summary of the Evidence 
The empirical estimates and fieldwork together suggest that the employees, as a temporary 
response following the periodic receipt of an incentive payment, place greater emphasis on 
unincentivized aspects of their work. This pattern is evident in unincentivized sales revenues and 
revenues per product, but also in call duration and tech team involvement, two similarly 
unincentivized, intermediate outcomes that employees knew to be of importance to their employer. 
Consistent with this presumed importance, when aggregated to the weekly level, average call 
duration and tech team involvement are meaningful predictors of sales revenues and sales revenues 
per product, even when adjusting for a lagged dependent variable and seasonality (see Appendix 
E). Combined with the null effect on incentivized performance, the collective findings are 
consistent with our proposed mechanism of salience-induced reciprocity – i.e., the temporary 
reciprocity in response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. Therefore, we 
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interpret the suite of evidence as inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, yet consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
DISCUSSION 
This article was motivated by the desire to better understand the performance effects of 
incentive plans. Inspired by agency and expectancy theories, the familiar focus in this literature has 
been on reward expectancy, deriving from the mere presence of an incentive plan and 
accompanying contract, and its role in shaping employees’ motivational states (Lawler 1973; 
Prendergast 1999). Moving beyond reward expectancy, we draw on research from across 
management, economics, and psychology to propose a salience-based theory that elucidates why 
and how the effectiveness of incentive plans can also derive from employees’ reactive responses 
to received incentive payments. We apply multivariate time-series methods to longitudinal data on 
an ongoing incentive plan, which, by design, keeps constant the reward expectancy stemming from 
the mere presence of the plan. Our findings show that periodic incentive payments temporarily 
boost various kinds of unincentivized behaviors and outcomes in economically meaningful ways, 
without traceably affecting the dynamics of incentivized performance. 
First and foremost, by theorizing and documenting the influence of periodic incentive 
payments on the temporal dynamics of performance, we contribute to a more complete theory of 
the performance effects of incentive plans. Of course, the mere presence of an incentive plan can 
shape performance through employees’ reward expectancy, and our study does not challenge or 
overturn the existence of this familiar explanatory channel. Rather, our contribution lies in 
proposing and showing that recurring, salience-induced responses to received rewards can 
constitute an additional and distinct channel. Indeed, our findings highlight that enhanced 
performance under an incentive plan can accumulate from across recurring, temporary performance 
boosts attributable to employees’ reactive responses to periodic incentive payments. Thus, 
combining the familiar logic of reward expectancy with our salience-based logic, performance 
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under an incentive plan can now plausibly be cast as the culmination of both proactive and reactive 
influences. Also, beyond establishing that meaningful reactive responses occur to received 
incentive payments, we contribute insight on the mechanism responsible for such dynamics. 
Specifically, because the receipt of an incentive payment increased attention to the ‘incentive-plan-
as-benefit’ and subsequent dynamics overwhelmingly occurred on unincentivized behaviors and 
outcomes, our study suggests a central role for salience-induced reciprocity as a causal driver of 
the resulting ebb and flow in performance. 
Second, our theory and evidence on the dynamic performance effects of incentive payments 
inform the broader understanding of effort dynamics in incentive plans. Some prior work points to 
time-varying incentives as a source of such dynamics, by revealing that employees may 
strategically reallocate effort over time, which can be dysfunctional and harm organizational 
outcomes (e.g., Asch 1990; Brahm & Poblete 2018; Larkin 2014; Oyer 1998). Other work suggests 
that effort dynamics may be traceable to external interventions that make incentives salient – e.g., 
an unobtrusive note regarding the piece rate at the beginning of a shift (Englmaier et al. 2017). In 
our empirical context, incentive pressure is stable within and across evaluation periods, which rules 
out strategic gaming, while no external interventions occurred. Thus, we extend prior work by 
showing that distinct performance dynamics may also occur in response to the periodic receipt of 
incentive payments – a routine event internal to any incentive plan – and that such dynamics may 
be beneficial rather than harmful to organizational outcomes. 
Together, these two contributions foreshadow some new ways for employers to influence the 
contributions that employees and HR interventions make to organizational outcomes. For example, 
employers keen to maintain a consistent level of motivation in their workforce can benefit from an 
awareness of the temporal dynamics we uncovered, which they can use to determine the optimal 
timing of alternative motivators, such as informal feedback or commitment-building activities. This 
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way, employers might choose to administer other motivators during the trough of the employee 
response to a periodic incentive payment. Also, to elicit salience-induced reciprocity and, thus, to 
see temporary responses to periodic incentive payments on unincentivized yet consequential 
aspects of employees’ work, employers may invest in cultivating the social dimension of the 
employment relationship, or screen potential employees for their pro-social dispositions. 
Finally, beyond contributing to the understanding of performance and effort dynamics in 
incentive plans, this article also contributes to the HR literature, in which performance dynamics 
remain underexplored as a topic of conceptual and empirical consequence. Scholars have 
progressively identified time and temporal dynamics as fundamental for understanding the 
functioning of compensation (Conroy et al. 2015; Shaw & Gupta 2015) and other HR practices 
(Aguinis & Bakker 2021; Jackson, Schuler, & Jiang 2014). Particularly relevant to our study, for 
example, a group of compensation scholars recently suggested that a “pressing research need” is 
to study “the dynamics of responses to pay forms over time” (Conroy et al. 2015: 213). 
Nevertheless, longitudinal studies remain scarce or based on short time series (Bainbridge, Sanders, 
Cogin, & Lin 2017; Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer 2012), while time often is a mere methodological 
device to assess cause and effect rather than a topic receiving conceptual attention. We contribute 
to this literature with a theory of temporal performance dynamics and introduce multivariate time-
series methods for examining such dynamics in longitudinal data, which we implement in the 
context of an incentive plan. 
By directly engaging with temporal dynamics, the methods we introduced can be applied to 
other HR practices in which time-varying responses, reverse causation, inertia, and resourcing 
trade-offs play a role. For example, they might inform questions regarding the temporality of 
recurring informal feedback, appraisals, or a variety of training and development interventions 
(e.g., Cappelli & Tavis 2016). Do such interventions produce performance dynamics? If so, then 
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how long does it take for performance effects to emerge, and how long do they last? How would 
such interventions dynamically affect other outcomes, such as job satisfaction or organizational 
commitment? And how would different interventions interact with one another and with relevant 
outcomes over time, as part of a broader HR system? These are just some of the new avenues that 
multivariate time-series methods can open up, which can help expand the understanding of how 
HR practices function and, ultimately, improve managerial practice. 
Other exciting areas for future inquiry exist that can address some of this study’s limitations, 
probe its scope conditions, and extend our research. First, our analyses and fieldwork delve into a 
suitable yet specific empirical site to identify the temporary responses to periodic incentive 
payments and establish a possible underlying mechanism. Because our theory does not rely on 
idiosyncratic features of this empirical context, future studies could examine the extent to which 
our framework holds in other firms and industries. In doing so, scholars must identify contextually 
important (intermediate) outcomes, which might be different from ours, and fieldwork will be 
important alongside econometric evidence to interpret the causal chain – from payment through 
relevant intermediate outcomes to performance. Second, employee performance in our context is 
malleable and products relatively inexpensive, so that performance can respond readily to incentive 
payments. While this characterizes a wide range of settings and product markets, the ensuing 
performance dynamics may depend on task complexity, the degree of control over outcomes, or 
the importance of customer deliberation. Third, even though their employment relationship is 
contractual to begin with, employees at WebCo do value informal, social approval by the employer. 
The relative strength of salience-induced refocusing, for which we found no support, and salience-
induced reciprocity may vary depending on the degree to which an employer’s esteem matters to 
employees. There seems to be value in future research more thoroughly probing the boundary 
conditions of these two distinct mechanisms. 
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Fourth, in our estimates, the incentive-payment effects on performance dynamics are causal 
according to Granger’s (1969) classic definition. Yet our reduced-form evidence does not readily 
permit statements about performance dynamics if payment intervals were different. We speculate 
that less frequent payments may draw more attention, yet they may also lose their value if the 
temporal wedge between performance and reward is too long. The net effects of countervailing 
implications such as these constitute an open question, and future research could examine how 
different payment frequencies affect performance dynamics. Fifth, one might look more closely at 
whether and how payment amounts matter for the nature of employees’ reactive responses to 
receiving an incentive payment. For example, prior work on “just noticeable differences” in pay 
(e.g., Mitra et al. 2016; Worley et al. 1992) would foreshadow that pay changes exceeding 5-7% 
might be needed to draw attention and elicit meaningful behavioral or affective reactions. Yet an 
upper threshold can exist too, beyond which reactions may be decreasingly consequential (Shaw 
2018). We believe it would be valuable to know whether variations in payment amount affect 
employees’ temporary responses to the receipt of incentive payments, and consistent with which 
functional form – e.g., a linear, step, or concave function – such responses emerge. 
Finally, opportunities exist to examine our salience-based mechanisms in pay-for-performance 
systems other than incentive plans, such as discretionary bonus or stock option plans (e.g., Cappelli 
et al. 2020; Nyberg et al. 2016), or collective bonus pools (e.g., Nyberg, Maltarich, Abdulsalam, 
Essman, & Cragun 2018). In some such alternative systems, received rewards have been argued to 
affect subsequent performance because they resolve ex-ante uncertainty regarding how much the 
prior performance of individual employees would be (deemed) worth. Our salience-based theory 
is distinct because it explains how responses to received rewards can occur even absent ex-ante 
uncertainty regarding the performance-reward relationship. In the spirit of emerging scholarship 
probing the mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of various pay-for-performance systems 
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(e.g., Benson & Sajjadiani 2018; Cappelli et al. 2020), we encourage studies of systems other than 
incentive plans that examine the explanatory power of a salience-based theory alongside more 
established mechanisms.  
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1. The adoption of an incentive plan may also alter the composition of the workforce (Gerhart, 
Rynes, & Fulmer 2009). For example, more productive employees might sort into firms offering 
an incentive plan (e.g., Cadsby, Song, & Tapon 2006; Lazear 2000). In the theory in this article, 
we abstract away from such sorting effects, and we account for them in the empirical analysis. 
2. One possible exception could be where employees are uncertain whether their employer will 
pay, unless employees proactively internalize such uncertainty, by adjusting downward their 
reward expectancy and, thus, their average level of effort. In the theory in this article, as is 
common in empirical studies of the performance effects of incentive plans, we abstract away 
from this kind of moral hazard. Also, we established that the employees in our empirical setting 
faced no such uncertainty. For example, the company was voted among the Best Workplaces by 
its own employees, and when we asked employees whether they were ever worried they might 
not be paid, a typical response was: “No, never!” One employee added: “Even if something went 
really, really wrong, we knew that the first…to be paid was us. This is the trust that we have 
with the company…this is the culture in our company. If there is a problem…the owners will 
not get their salaries, but we will.” 
3. The individual weights (i.e., the “piece rates”) are omitted here for confidentiality. Yet, as we 
will show in the Results section, once we directly account for possible trade-offs across tasks 
resulting from heterogeneous weights, our inference regarding the influence of Incentive 
payment on the dynamics of Task performance remains unchanged. 
4. In the spirit of Sims (1980), we specify and estimate a reduced form that imposes no a priori 
restrictions on the ordering of relations among the endogenous variables. 
5. This Sales revenues equation accounts for AdWords and Tweets as endogenous demand drivers, 
and Holiday, End of month, Beginning of month, Industry growth, and quarters as controls for 
exogenous demand shifts. Additionally, the autoregressive coefficient, 𝛽22
1 , absorbs the possible 
effects of purchase reinforcement (additional purchases by existing customers) and word-of-
mouth (new purchases influenced by existing customers); see Dekimpe and Hanssens (1995). 
6. In both Figures B1 and B2, for expositional clarity, we omit error margins, which in all cases 
span the horizontal axis representing the counterfactual performance baseline. 
7. These numbers derive from a forecast error variance decomposition of Sales revenues, which 
enumerates the amount of information that variation in each endogenous variable contributes 
towards explaining the time-series variation in sales performance (Lütkepohl 2005). Most such 
variation – about 88% – is explained by the own past of Sales revenues, underlining the possible 
importance of purchase reinforcement and word-of-mouth for this firm’s sales performance over 
time (see Footnote 5). The management was keenly aware of word-of-mouth: “When a customer 
is happy, they [will] tell someone else and you will have an increase in sales.” 
8. The table in Appendix D illustrates how we estimated the additional revenue per euro spent. 
The table summarizes the euro value of the weekly sales revenue effects (2-standard-error 
bounds in brackets) of a one-standard deviation impulse in Incentive payment, and it also shows 
dynamic responses to a one-standard deviation impulse in AdWords for comparison. The Total 
revenues column sums the point estimates for the impulse responses across all the weeks in 
which such responses are meaningfully different from zero (Colicev & Pauwels 2020). The last 
column, Additional revenues per euro spent, divides Total revenues by the Incentive payment 
or AdWords standard deviation, respectively, and subtracts the one euro spent, to obtain an 
estimate of the additional revenues due to a euro of incentive or AdWords payment. 
9. Call quality may not increase monotonously in call duration because very long calls are at times 
less effective. In our setting, however, the number of answered calls is itself incentivized, so 
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that employees resist unnecessarily long calls. While call duration is the best proxy available to 
us, only data on call content can directly answer questions of call quality and how it relates to 
subsequent sales performance. 
10. Our fieldwork suggests that the small delay in the temporary response of call duration to the 
incentive payment occurs because incentive payments are settled through bank transfer rather 
than a physical paycheck handed directly to employees. This indirect payment channel 
mechanically introduces a delay between the moment of payment and the moment the payment 
becomes evident to employees. 
 





Table 1. Summary Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (N=169 weeks) 
 
      Summary statistics   Bivariate correlations 
  Variable (Label) Mean SD Min Max   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Dependent variables                                         
1. Task performance (TPt) 0.00 0.78 -1.82 1.59                               
2. Sales revenues (St) 27075 6652 12521 57550   0.68                           
Independent variable                                         
3. Incentive payment (IPt) 104.21 215.59 0.00 879.38   0.12 0.11                         
Control variables                                         
4. AdWords (AWt) 851.83 658.31 0.00 2018.95   0.71 0.69 0.11                       
5. Tweets (Tt) 44.96 31.56 2.00 183.00   -0.29 -0.23 -0.05 -0.51                     
6. Expansion (EDt) 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00   0.77 0.50 0.13 0.66 -0.35                   
7. Holiday (HDt) 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00   -0.07 -0.34 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.01                 
8. AdWords used (ADt) 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00   0.69 0.56 0.15 0.89 -0.61 0.75 -0.01               
9. Tweets intensive (TDt) 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00   -0.21 -0.27 -0.05 -0.29 0.66 -0.30 0.13 -0.33             
10. End of month (EoMDt) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00   -0.04 -0.10 -0.27 0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.06           
11. Beginning of month (BoMDt) 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00   0.01 0.02 0.67 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.30         
12. Industry growth (It) 414793 81057 307692 576923   0.08 -0.18 0.00 -0.14 -0.02 0.26 -0.01 0.12 -0.10 0.00 -0.01       
13. Quarter 2 (QD2t) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00   -0.13 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.17 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.23     
14. Quarter 3 (QD3t) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00   -0.11 -0.32 0.02 -0.07 0.20 -0.03 0.13 -0.02 0.41 0.00 0.01 -0.27 -0.30   
15. Quarter 4 (QD4t) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00   0.21 0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.28 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.14 -0.30 -0.30 
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit-Root Tests (N=169 weeks) 
Variable t-statistica   p-valuea   
p-value on deterministic 
trendb 
Task performance -7.66   0.000   0.000 
Sales revenues -6.23   0.000   0.000 
Incentive payment -16.70   0.000   0.037 
AdWordsc -4.74   0.000   0.000 
Tweets -3.31   0.068   0.060 
a. H0: the variable has a unit root; H1: the variable is stationary 
b. H0: the variable does not follow a linear trend; H1: the variable follows a linear trend 
c. Reported tests on series after Google AdWords adopted in January 2012 (N=115 weeks). 
 





Figure 1. Hypothesized Performance Dynamics in Stylized Form 
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Figure 3. Response of Task Performance in Weeks 0-4 to 1-SD Impulse in Incentive Payment 
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Figure 5. Responses of Number of Products and Sales Revenues per Product in Weeks 0-4 to 






Figure 6. Responses of Average Call Duration and Tech Team Involvement on Days 0-9 to 
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APPENDIX A: SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF VAR 
MODEL (EQUATION 1)a 
 
  Endogenous variables 
  Task performance Sales revenues Incentive payment AdWords Tweets 
Lagged endogenous variables           
Task performance (t-1) 0.22 -208.98 25.42 16.81 -1.21 
  [0.08] [518.84] [25.14] [34.05] [2.72] 
Sales revenues (t-1) -0.00 0.33 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
  [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Incentive payment (t-1) 0.00 3.74 -0.14 -0.12 -0.00 
  [0.00] [1.31] [0.06] [0.09] [0.01] 
AdWords (t-1) 0.00 -1.03 0.09 0.38 -0.00 
  [0.00] [1.09] [0.05] [0.07] [0.01] 
Tweets (t-1) -0.00 -6.45 0.04 -0.70 0.53 
  [0.00] [13.32] [0.65] [0.87] [0.07] 
Exogenous variables           
Expansion 0.89 2,092.90 -3.68 -94.97 16.23 
  [0.20] [1,319.42] [63.93] [86.60] [6.91] 
Holiday -0.25 -5,701.81 -42.54 -57.24 -11.19 
  [0.16] [1,016.87] [49.27] [66.74] [5.33] 
AdWords used -0.55 -1,161.07 -3.05 199.90 -11.04 
  [0.16] [1,042.04] [50.49] [68.39] [5.46] 
Tweets intensive 0.51 2,255.00 -36.61 58.18 43.47 
  [0.27] [1,768.66] [85.70] [116.09] [9.27] 
End of month -0.08 -139.03 -76.44 27.94 -4.97 
  [0.11] [685.74] [33.23] [45.01] [3.59] 
Beginning of month 0.02 1,324.17 294.81 -34.22 -0.82 
  [0.11] [702.70] [34.05] [46.12] [3.68] 
Industry growth 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Quarter 2 -0.09 -1,182.67 22.96 -52.52 -1.49 
  [0.11] [722.95] [35.03] [47.45] [3.79] 
Quarter 3 -0.21 -4,775.60 21.33 -118.04 -5.70 
  [0.14] [883.40] [42.80] [57.98] [4.63] 
Quarter 4 -0.16 -2,667.62 49.95 -218.18 -4.72 
  [0.12] [812.45] [39.37] [53.33] [4.26] 
Constant -0.90 3,339.93 -29.76 -150.88 10.30 
  [0.27] [1,732.49] [83.94] [113.71] [9.08] 
R-squared 0.40 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.67 
a. Standard errors in brackets; N=168 (169 weeks with one-week lag).       
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APPENDIX B: RESPONSES OF DISAGGREGATED TASK PERFORMANCE TO 
INCENTIVE PAYMENT 
 
Figure B1. Responses of Task Performance Quantity and Quality in Weeks 0-4 to 1-SD 
Impulse in Incentive Payment in Week 0 
  
 
Figure B2. Responses of Five Individual Measures of Task Performance in Weeks 0-4 to 1-
SD Impulse in Incentive Payment in Week 0 
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APPENDIX C: RESPONSE OF TASK PERFORMANCE ON DAYS 0-6 TO INCENTIVE 
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APPENDIX D: WEEKLY AND TOTAL REVENUES, AND ADDITIONAL REVENUES PER EURO SPENT, FOR 
IMPULSES IN INCENTIVE PAYMENT AND ADWORDSa 
 
    Euro response in revenues by week since impulse       






Incentive payment   331.47 704.33 160.73 49.09 13.88   1196.52 4.60 
    [77.38, 585.55] [467.46, 941.20] [46.17, 275.28] [-7.63, 105.81] [-15.44, 43.19]       
                    
AdWords   323.26 -139.27 -57.62 -23.53 -7.40   323.26 0.51 
    [66.43, 580.09] [-404.20, 125.66] [-246.24, 131.01] [-131.61, 84.55] [-68.37, 53.56]       
a. Impulse responses are shown with 2-standard-error bounds in brackets. 
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APPENDIX E: OLS ESTIMATES OF SALES REVENUES (PER PRODUCT) AS A 
FUNCTION OF AVERAGE CALL DURATION AND TECH TEAM INVOLVEMENT 
 
Dependent variable: Sales revenuesb   
Sales revenues per 
product 
Sales revenues (t-1) 0.272 0.307       
  [0.079] [0.124]       
Sales revenues per product (t-1)       0.520 0.459 
        [0.090] [0.090] 
Average call durationc 985.012     0.158   
  [376.659]     [0.073]   
Tech team involvementc   709.210     0.163 
    [249.536]     [0.082] 
Holiday -5,696.721 -4,952.786   0.181 0.515 
  [1,234.849] [1,287.678]   [0.183] [0.275] 
Quarter 2 -1,277.449 -1,024.456   -0.276 -0.211 
  [905.665] [1,326.091]   [0.194] [0.230] 
Quarter 3 -3,393.296 -4,333.672   0.017 -0.370 
  [978.807] [1,258.833]   [0.192] [0.269] 
Quarter 4 -1,760.201 -1,641.948   -0.361 -0.240 
  [556.149] [732.158]   [0.125] [0.137] 
Constant 1,997.519 2,077.073   6.322 6.884 
  [438.049] [639.450]   [1.189] [1.155] 
R-squared 0.55 0.47   0.38 0.35 
N (weeks) 168 92   168 92 
a. Newey-West standard errors in brackets. 
b. Sales revenues has been detrended.         
c. Average call duration is the average call duration in week t and Tech team involvement is 
the number of times the tech team helped confirm customer solutions in week t. Both have 
been standardized to facilitate like-for-like comparisons of the regression coefficients. 
 
